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A Brief Profile of Oei Tjong Ie
Oei Tjong Ie was born in Semarang in 1918 as the eldest son of Ho Kiem Hoa Nio (or Lucy
Ho), the seventh wife of Oei Tiong Ham. After receiving primary education in Semarang, he
went to the Netherlands for secondary and university education. In 1940 he returned to In-
donesia, and began working for Kian Gwan. In the early postwar years, he worked for Kian
Gwan in Shanghai and in Bangkok. For the past few decades he has been heading Kian Gwan in
Singapore. Mter the death of his brother, Tjong Hauw, in 1950, he served as chairman of Oei
Tiong Ham Concern. He is also a founder of Malayan Banking Berhad and served as chairman in
its first several years.
Interview
1. Personal Background
Mr. Oei, can you tell me first who you are and
how you are related to Oei Tiong Ham?
My name is Oei Tjong Ie. I was born in
Semarang in Indonesia on January 9, 1918,
which makes me 69 years old by European
count and 70 by Asian count. I am the eldest
son of one of my father's wives. As you may
know, my father was a polygamist. My
mother was the second to the last wife my
father married, and I am the eldest son of that
mother, but in the total number of Oei Tiong
Ham's sons, I am the tenth son.
Could you tell me a little about your educa-
tional background?
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I went to a primary school in what was then
the Netherlands Indies, and then went to what
was called in the Dutch system a middelbare
school, which was a middle school. A middle
school was a school which gave you entrance
to a university. At the middle school called
HBS, it usually took five years for science
students to finish. For arts students who had
to study languages like Latin and Greek, it
took six to seven yearsto finish. I was an arts
student, and after finishing the middle school,
I joined the Dutch Law University in Leiden,
and a few years later, passed an intermediate
examination for the Dutch equivalent of
L.L.B. In 1940, when I had another six months
to complete my law study, I went back to
Indonesia to be properly installed as one of
the shareholders of Oei Tiong Ham Concern,
since I had come of age. But the subsequent
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German invasion of Holland followed by the
Japanese invasion of Java forced me to stay
behind, and I joined the import department of
Kian Gwan as a trainee salesman in the provi-
sion & drinks division.
Can you talk a little bit about your brothers
and sisters and the different wives of your
father?
I remember the wife of my father who was the
mother of Tjong Hauw. She was a quiet, nice
lady who was not at all disagreeable to me, be-
ing a son of another wife, and I know that she
even received my mother quite well and was
very friendly to her. In an early postwar
year, she left Indonesia for New York with
two sons when they decided to live there. I
think she must have been miserable there, liv-
ing in a strange, American environment. I
met her there once. She always stayed on the
first floor in their house; I believe she never
left it, and finally died there.
Another wife I know is the wife my father
took after my mother. She had only one
daughter. She was also a very nice lady. I
used to go to her house. She served me with
all sorts of food.
This was in Semarang, wasn't it?
Yes, it was in Semarang. The rest of my
father's wives, I don't know personally.
You have a sister called Hui Lan, don't you?
Yes. She is Mrs. Wellington Koo. She is the
second daughter of my father's first wife.
She is the one who writes all those saucy
stories about my father being poisoned by my
mother and you know all these mosquito ar-
ticles. She must be still alive-if she is, she
must be well over 90.
She was never involved in business, was she?
No. She was a very autocratic lady. I
remember I saw her in Shanghai in 1946 for
the first time. She was living there, and she
was very close to the American ambassador's
wife. She had always lived in diplomatic
circles. She sort of summoned me to the
American embassy, and asked me about my
personal life. When she found out that I had
a Dutch wife, she told me to get rid of her
because I am Chinese, and also get rid of my
Dutch passport and get instead a Chinese
passport. She tried to tell me how to run my
life. But I explained to her, "Look, my dear
sister, I respect you because you are my elder
sister, but I am a rather independent type of
person. So, please let me live my life in the
way I like, and you live in the way you like."
Did she have a brother?
No, her mother had only two daughters. The
other daughter, I never met in my life. I hear
that she married a high-ranking Kuomintang
official. She must be no longer alive.
Did your father take a wife in Singapore?
No. When he came to Singapore, I think I
was about three to four years old. I was
born in Indonesia and went to Singapore with
my father. To the best of my knowledge or
my mother's, my father did not have another
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wife in Singapore.
So, did your mother come to Singapore, and
was she the only wife living in Singapore?
Yes. The old man was settling down, you
see. My mother was an overseas Chinese
born in the Netherlands Indies, and compared
with my father's other wives, she was well
educated-Westem-educated. I know, for
instance, in the later years of his life, my mother
helped him a lot in his business, especially in
dealing with Dutch-speaking people. I think
she was also useful to my father in Singapore.
You said the first wife had two daughters.
And the second wife?
The second wife had one daughter. The
third wife had many children. I think she was
the wife who had most children. She had five
sons (Tjong Tee, Tjong Swan, Tjong Tiong,
Tjong Yoe, and Tjong Liam) and a few
daughters. The fifth wife, the mother of
Tjong Hauw, had four sons and one
daughter. Altogether, my father had eight or
nine wives. My mother was the second to the
last. But the last one was not kept for long.
Maybe, my mother protested to my father.
Did all wives live in Semarang except your
mother who went to Singapore with your
father?
Yes.
We had a huge house. It was situated at the
beginning of Tjandi. Tjandi is a hilly area.
It was in the outskirts of the downtown. It
was called Gergadjie. That was a big house.
If I remember correctly, there were sixteen to
eighteen rooms in it. It had a main building,
and two pavilions on its sides. A lot of the un-
married children of my father lived there.
This was like a compound. There was one
large dining hall. When a gong sounded,
everyone went to eat. It was quite a walk
from where we lived. That house also had a
big garden. It was a little like the Tiger Balm
Gardens in Singapore. On Sundays and
public holidays, it was open to the public. It
was made a bit in the style of a Japanese
garden. There were ponds with fish and
rocks where you could go up and down.
There were also cages. I hear my father once
kept tigers, but in my time, there were no
more tigers. Instead, we had a lot of deer and
horses.
Did your father's wives stay in the same com-
pound?
No, they stayed separately. My mother
stayed with my father in the big house, but
the other wives stayed in other houses. My
grandfather, I am told, who lived in Penggil-
ing near the family cemetery, kept two to
three wives in the same house.
2. Oei Tiong Ham's Business Method
Did your father speak English?
Did your mother tell you what sort of house
your father had in Semarang? No.
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Did he speak Dutch?
No.
In your half-sister Hui Lan's memoirs, she
says your father went with her to the
residence of the Governor of Singapore for din-
ner one day. Is it possible that although he
did not speak Dutch or English, he
understood them? And did he speak Malay or
Javanese?
I doubt he had some understanding of Dutch
or English. If he went to the residence of the
Governor of Singapore for dinner with Hui
Lan, he must have depended on her to inter-
pret. He had a smattering of Malay but he
did not speak Javanese.
Who did negotiations with the Netherlands
Indies government?
He had professional people to do that. My
father's strong point was that he was not
afraid of delegating authority and had a knack
for finding the right people. Sometimes, a
. successful businessman need not be very
clever himself, but he must have a gift for
choosing the right people.
But that is difficult for a Chinese
businessman. Eu Tong Sen and Loke Yew of
Malaya, for example, found delegation of
power difficult. How did your father over-
come this? One time, I was looking into the
histories of OCBC and Lee Rubber. The suc-
cess of Lee Kong Chian, who founded Lee
Rubber and was a major shareholder of
OCBC, can be explained by the fact that he
built up a professional management team.
But in his case, he was influenced by Western
management because he studied English and
read English books on management. But
your father did not speak English or Dutch.
How did he find out about the importance of
delegation of power in business?
I think he looked around.
Modem companies in Indonesia at that time
were almost all Dutch.
Yes. He saw that they were running better
than his business, and looked into why. He
learned about their business system and in-
troduced some of their management prac-
tices.
He did not have Dutch friends, because he did
not speak Dutch.
No, he did not mix with Dutchmen. I don't
remember ever seeing any Dutchmen coming
to our family, and my mother told me that he
was never close to any European.
3. Line of Succession
Your father moved to Singapore towards the
end of his life, didn't he?
Yes, he did, because he had trouble with
Dutch tax authorities. Dutch taxation was, I
think, one of the harshest in the world.
Could you tell me under what circumstance
your father died? Was the death expected, or
was it sudden?
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I would say that he died suddenly. Nobody ex-
pected him to die so quickly. He was 57
when he died, and he had no alarming sYmP-
tom of illness which would explain such a sud-
den passing. As I told you, I was very young
at that time. I only remember it vaguely and
know what my mother told me later. He died
of a heart attack, which I think is very possi-
ble because our family is known to suffer from
a bad heart condition.
Including yourself?
No. I am an exception. I have a perfect heart
condition. But all my other brothers died ofa
heart attack at quite young ages.
Could you tell me the line of succession in Dei
Tiong Ham Concern after your father died?
Mter Oei Tiong Ham died, the eldest son, Oei
Tjong Swan, became the head of the Con-
cern. But he did not stay long, and sold his
shares to his brothers. He was succeeded by
my other elder half-brother, Dei Tjong Hauw.
How many years did Dei Tjong Hauw head
the Concern?
He took over when I was nine years old.
Was it around 1927?
Yes. And he continued to head the concern un-
til 1950, when he died suddenly. He died at
the young age of 47.
Did he die by accident?
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No, he died of a heart attack.
It was sudden, wasn't it?
Yes. It was very sudden.
Who took over after his death?
After he died, for some years, that is, two to
three years, Dei Tiong Ham Concern was run
by a team consisting of his brothers and pro-
fessional managers. They were Tan Tek
Peng, one of the most senior directors; Dr.
Djie Ting Ham, who was in charge of the
sugar factories; Dr. Djie Ting Liat, who was a
chartered accountant and the financial direc-
tor of the Dei Tiong Ham Concern; and the
three younger brothers of Dei Tjong
Hauw's-Dei Tjong Tjiat, Dei Tjong Van, and
Dei Tjong Ik. Then, after several meetings,
they decided that I should take over because
the chief executive officer of Dei Tiong Ham
Concern had to travel, but none of Dei Tjong
Hauw's brothers was prepared to travel. So,
because of that and because I was all-round in
the company and more extrovert, I was con-
sidered to be a suitable successor. And the ti-
tle of "president director" was changed to
"chairman of the board." This was decided at
a meeting which we held in Amsterdam.
Were you heading the group in 1961 when the
Indonesian government decided to confiscate
your family interests in Indonesia?
Yes. I was heading the group as such, but its
Indonesian operation was headed by my
youngest brother, Dei Tjong Tjay, who was
living in Indonesia. This was necessary for
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political reasons, but the impression was
mistakenly created at that time that Tjong
Tjay was heading the whole group.
However, for political expediency, because of
our difficult and vulnerable position in In-
donesia, we never contradicted the impres-
sion.
4. Oei Tiong Ham Concern around
1940
Could you tell me about Kian Gwan around
the year 1940? Especially about how big it
was and what were its major activities at that
time.
The major operations of Kian Gwan... Oh, you
have to remember that it was a department of
Oei Tiong Ham Concern, Kian Gwan being
the trading arm of Oei Tiong Ham Concern.
Then, could you tell me about the major ac-
tivities of Dei Tiong Ham Concern?
The principal activity was sugar milling. We
had at that time five sugar mills, if I remember
correctly. They were located in a place out-
side Semarang, called Pakkies; near Madiun;
in Tanggoelangin; in Ponen; in Krebet, near
Malang; and in Redjoagoeng.
In Krebet, did you have a tapioca factory?
Yes. There were a sugar factory and a tapioca
factory there.
Besides sugar, was Oei Tiong Ham Concern
involved in shipping and banking at that time?
Correct. We had a small banking department
called "Bank Vereeniging Oei Tiong Ham." In
Dutch, "vereeniging" means association. So,
Bank Vereeniging Oei Tiong Ham could be
translated as the "Bank Association of Oei
Tiong Ham."
How about shipping?
The shipping company was called "Heap Eng
Moh Steamship Co."
Was it based in Semarang?
It was based in Semarang as well as in
Singapore. I do not remember whether its
ships were sailing under the British or Dutch
flag. It might have been under the British
flag.
When you joined Oei Tiong Ham Concern, did
you feel that it had grown larger since Dei
Tiong Ham died, or did you feel that it had
become smaller?
I cannot say that it had become bigger, but I
can say that it had become better con-
solidated. My father laid the foundation for
the large trading and industrial organization,
which was run very much under the Western
system of accounting and engineering. And I
think that after my father's death, the suc-
cessors, Dei Tjong Hauw and Dei Tjong
Swan, both of whom were my elder half-
brothers, carried out further modernization.
Where was the head office of Oei Tiong Ham
Concern located in the prewar period?
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In Semarang.
Along the coast there?
No, it was downtown. A large two-storey
building was its headquarters. It was an im-
pressive building. It was built by a famous ar-
chitect in Semarang at that time. His name
was Liem Bwan Tjie. It was impressive
because it was full of marble.
Was it built in a Chinese style?
No, it was built more in an Italian style. The
marble was Italian marble. A director's room
was impressive; it had a thick carpet, a heavy
curtain, and a teak panelling.
When you joined the company in 1940, how
many people were working there?
In Semarang or in Oei Tiong Ham Concern as
a whole?
In the headquarters in Semarang.
Not that many. Roughly, it was no more than
100 to 120.
In Oei Tiong Ham Concern as a whole?
Including those at the sugar mills and others,
it must have been a few thousands.
What do you remember about the Krebet
tapioca factory?
It was a big, modem factory. I remember we
were very proud of the factory. It was very
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famous for an excellent laboratory. Tapioca
was used to make a glue needed for aircraft
wings. This factory was so modem that it
was visited by many managers of the factories
of Dutch financial combines. They were
shown around by the manager of the Krebet
factory. He was a big Dutchman. He did not
have a moustache, but was an impressive-look-
ing European. I remember his name was
Tacoma. I knew him well. As a young ex-
ecutive, I used to spend weekends at the
tapioca estate which was combined with a
sugar factory. We used to go hunting.
Tacoma was a well-known hunter. We went
for wild boar shooting. We walked miles and
miles in the field.
Was he an engineer?
No, he was not an engineer. He was a non-
technical man; I think he was a well-qualified
planter. The engineer of that particular fac-
tory was a Chinese named Yap Kie Ling.
There were two Yap brothers. Both were
engineers. They were graduates of Delft. It
was the engineering university of Holland at
that time.
How many Dutch were employed at the
Krebet factory? Was Tacoma the only one?
No, he was not the only one. I did not pay
much attention to it, but since there were a
few Europeans in the laboratory, my guess is
that six or seven Europeans were working
there.
You said that there were five sugar mills. Did
you employ Dutchmen there also?
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Yes. The manager of a sugar mill in our group
was called in Dutch administrateur, whose
English equivalent is "administrator." That
is because the manager was Dutch. To the
best of my knowledge, all managers of my
father's factories were Dutch.
They were not necessarily engineers.
Not necessarily.
Were the chief engineers of your factory
mostly European?
No, we had some senior Chinese engineers,
like the Yap brothers I mentioned earlier.
Roughly then, were half the chief engineers
European and half Chinese?
In my time, the two top engineers were
Chinese, not European.
Were they exceptions, or were there other
Chinese engineers?
At that time, there were other Chinese
engineers. I remember a lot of these
engineers were formerly ship engineers. I
don't know whether this was a coincidence.
Many of our engineers used to work in the
engine room of a ship.
Maybe, the same kind of engine was used
both in ships and factories.
Maybe the same kind of engine, come to think
of it.
Many Chinese were engaged in coastal ship-
ping at that time, so there must have been a
number of Chinese who were familiar with
engines.
I definitely remember many of our engineers,
even senior chief engineers, were Chinese,
not European.
Did you employ around 1940 any Chinese
university graduates who were not engineers?
Yes, I told you about Dr. Djie Ting Ham and
Dr. Djie Ting Liat. They were both Dutch
university graduates.
Did they start working under Tjong Hauw?
Yes. Then we had Dutch-trained, Chinese
chartered accountants.
Going back to your Dutch employees. How
were they supervised? Take the case of
Tacoma, whom you mentioned earlier. Who
was in charge of him and evaluated his perfor-
mance? Was this done by Dei Tjong Hauw, or
by someone outside the family who was in
charge of personnel for the operation of Dei
Tiong Ham Concern as a whole?
I believe Tacoma was directly answerable to
Yap Kie Ling and Djie Ting Ham, who were
in charge of sugar mills and stationed in the
head office in Semarang. All the senior direc-
tors in tum were answerable to the top man
and that man was my half-brother Oei Tjong
Hauw.
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5. Dutch Language and Cultural
Influence
At that time, were the documents you submit-
ted to the government in Dutch?
Yes, the official language used in the office
was Dutch. Not Indonesian or English, but
Dutch.
Did you speak to your brothers in Bahasa
Indonesia, Dutch or a Chinese dialect?
We spoke in Dutch. I don't think any of my
brothers could speak Chinese. Tjong Hauw
claimed that he could speak Chinese, but I
never conversed with him in Chinese, so I can-
not judge the standard of his Chinese. But
later I heard that his standard was not high,
and some people said that I spoke Chinese
better than he did. I learned Chinese mostly
during my detention in prison and later in
Shanghai.
So, by 1940, can we say that Oei Tjong
Ham Concern had become a "Dutch-oriented"
company?
Yes, if you mean by that the atmosphere,
management system, and organization. We
were very much Dutch-based at that time.
Wasn't it a bit unusual to become like that for
a Chinese-owned company?
Yes. Other large Chinese companies were not
like that. I remember another Chinese com-
pany which was handling food and drinks. It
was considered one of the largest companies.
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The name of the company was Lauw Tjin.
That company was not so Dutch oriented as
we were. I knew the manager of the com-
pany. He was not Dutch-speaking. He was
Chinese-educated in Indonesia.
What did the company do?
Lauw Tjin?
Yes.
They were an importer. They handled, for
example, foodstuff and household electric
appliances. I remember they handled
"Kelvinator" air conditioners and refrig-
erators.
Did the Chinese community in Semarang con-
sider your family a little strange, since you
were speaking to each other in Dutch instead
of Chinese?
I don't think that they considered us strange.
In a small town like Semarang, we were so
well-known that wherever we went, people
recognized us and paid us respect. We were
big shots. I could speak Indonesian, so most
of the Chinese I knew spoke to me in Indone-
sian. I remember the grandparents on my
mother's side, who were not Dutch speaking,
spoke to me in Indonesian.
At that time, business in the Chinese com-
munity was done in Chinese, I suppose. How
did you get around this problem?
Yes, to a great extent, business was done in
Chinese, especially in the pasar, or market.
They often spoke in Hokkien.
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How about Tjong Hauw?
How did you deal with the merchants in the
pasar if you did not speak Chinese?
I could speak simple Chinese, but we had
many salesmen who were fluent in Chinese.
The importing department of Kian Gwan was
selling its goods directly to Chinese shops.
We were the importer of, for example, Dr.
West toothbrushes, West clocks and alarm
clocks, Solingen knives from Germany,
General Milk products from the USA, canned
abalone and other sea foods from Japan, and
American canned foods like Del Monte.
These goods were sold to shops in the market
by our Chinese salesmen who were either In-
donesian-speaking or Hokkien-speaking. But
in the industrial division, we had little contact
with the market, because we mainly dealt
with estates where the managers were Dutch-
speaking. And in our sugar sales division,
negotiations were mostly with offices abroad,
and here again Chinese was of little use.
Going back to your family. Since you did not
speak Chinese, am I correct in saying that you
did not get much involved in the affairs of the
Chinese community directly?
Are you talking about my elder half-brothers
or my own brothers?
Both.
My elder half-brothers were of a type who
came to the office and never left it. They
never came into contact with the public.
Except Tjong Hauw.
Was Tjong Hauw very much involved in the
Chinese business community affairs?
No. He went to the economic ministries of the
Netherlands Indies government, went to
banks...
So, you were not the leader of the Chinese
community. Is this correct?
In a way, it is correct. Socially we were not
the leader of the Chinese community, since
we were not Chinese-oriented. But since we
had money and influence, we occupied an
important position in the community.
After independence, did you still speak to
each other in Dutch, or did you make an effort
to use Bahasa Indonesia in board meetings,
management conferences, and other impor-
tant meetings?
When outsiders were involved and they were
super-nationalistic, efforts were made to
speak in Indonesian. But many Indonesians
spoke Dutch, and when they were involved,
there was no problem in speaking in Dutch.
Many commercial terms were Dutch, and it
was difficult to express yourself in Indonesian
when you were dealing with business mat-
ters. Maybe now, since so many words have
been added to the Indonesian vocabulary, it is
not too difficult to discuss business in Indone-
sian, but not at that time.
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In order to talk to civilian and military
authorities, it must have been important to be
good at Indonesian.
Yes and no. A lot of military leaders even
came from the Dutch education stream and
spoke Dutch. Once they knew you, they
often lapsed into Dutch.
6. Pacific War
How did the Pacific War affect Oei Tiong
Ham Concern? Did it stop operation during
the war?
No. As far as Indonesia was concerned, the
mills continued to produce sugar under
Japanese supervision. In Java at that time,
the Japanese Army set up an administration
called "Gunseikanbu, " and we operated under
their supervision.
During the war, were some of your family
members or professional managers impris-
oned or harmed by the Japanese Army?
To the best of my knowledge, the only person
imprisoned was myself. None of my brothers
and our staff was ever imprisoned. But for
some time, all of our offices and godowns were
sealed. And only after the appearance of cer-
tain Gunseikanbu officers were they opened
again, and we resumed business activities and
tried to do our best under the circumstances.
Many rich Chinese had to pay contributions to
the Japanese military government, and a lot of
ill feeling was created by this, for example, in
Malaya. Did this happen in Indonesia, in par-
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ticular to your family?
Yes, I think it affected our family. We were
compelled to supply a lot of goods to the
Japanese Army, like leather. We had a
leather stock in Surabaya. But I must say
that the Japanese Army was fair. We were
paid what I considered correct prices. When
I was sentenced to death by Gunritsu Kaigi (a
Japanese court-martial), my brother saved my
life. He was branded later by the Dutch as a
collaborator, but I think this was unfair,
because any Chinese businessman had to col-
laborate with the Japanese. He had to give
parties to Japanese authorities, and appear on
the front page of newspapers, pledging loy-
alty to the Emperor. These things have to be
judged under the circumstances. Being a
member of the War Crimes Commission after
the war, I expressed my opinion strongly
about this, especially when they came to at-
tack my brother. I don't know whether he lik-
ed the Japanese or he believed in the Japanese
military expansion scheme, because I never
asked him about these, but I feel he had no
choice but to act in the way he did. Because
he had good contacts with Japanese military
authorities during the war, he could exert
strong influence on the Japanese, which I
believe saved my life. While he appealed to
the Japanese Command to spare my life, he
donated to the Japanese Navy the check
which he had received as the payment for the
sugar they had taken from our godowns in
Surabaya. The check amounted to about 1.5
million guilders. The Japanese made a pro-
paganda out of this donation. This money, in
fact, bought my life. On the day of my execu-
tion, I was told that my sentence was com-
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muted to imprisonment for 15 years, of which
I spent two-and-half years in prison, until the
Japanese surrender. So, after the war, I was
in a difficult position. On the one hand, I was
the leader of the younger group trying to gain
control of our family business. On the other,
the elder brother had been my protector.
7. Postwar Evolution
Many Chinese big businessmen in the late
1930s were seriously affected by the Pacific
War, but after the war ended, many of them
recovered and did well thereafter. In the
case of Oei Tjong Ham Concern, if you take
1950 as a reference point, how did the com-
pany compare with 1930. Did it become
smaller or bigger?
I would say that it became smaller.
Why was this?
First of all, the very difficult political situation
in Indonesia after the war. Our major opera-
tion was concentrated in Indonesia, and the
deteriorating economic situation there
affected our overseas branches. And the board
of directors did not have any clear-cut policy.
There was political in-fighting among several
board members, and there was no strong
member of the family who could take charge
in Indonesia. I say this with certain reserva-
tion, but I believe that it is basically correct,
for their choice in 1950 of one of our youngest
brothers to head our Indonesian operation
was not very fortunate. He was too young,
although he was a university graduate-he
had a master's degree in economics from a
university in New York. He was not familiar
with the condition in Indonesia. He did not
speak Indonesian. He was not aware of the
profound change in the mentality of Indone-
sian officials. He approached the running of
the company very much with the colonial at-
titude which prevailed before the war. It was
not entirely his fault. Most of the directors
had the same mental attitude. I was in In-
donesia at the time the Japanese made the In-
donesians become aware of the possibility of
attaining independence, and having had many
Indonesian friends with whom I spoke very
freely-I was fluent in Indonesian, I
understood better the profound change in In-
donesian mentality. But most of the board
directors did not realize this, and continued to
run the company on the old colonial basis, so
we were not very successful in the postwar
years.
What happened to the five sugar mills you
owned before the war?
Of the five, only two were working at full
capacity around 1950. They were the fac-
tories at Redjoagoeng near Madiun and
Krebet in East Java. The others were in-
hibited-they were laid up; the machinery
was preserved but not used.
Did Oei Tiong Ham Concern own sugar planta-
tions before the war?
No. The system was such that we owned
sugar factories, but we did not own planta-
tions.
A few years after 1950, when you became
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chairman of the board of Oei Tiong Ham Con-
cern, what was its major activity? Was it
sugar milling or general trading?
I think sugar had become less and less impor-
tant, since the land on which sugar was grown
was not owned by us but by Indonesians and
we could not force them to plant sugar cane.
What happened was they found other crops
more profitable and grew less and less sugar
cane. So, the importance of the sugar
business declined, and we were very much
engaged in assisting the Indonesian govern-
ment in purchasing rice, mainly from
Thailand and Burma. At that time, there was
a Dutch company called "Internatio," which
was an accredited rice purchaser for the
Indonesian government. Since they were a
pure Dutch company and we were more
Asian, I remember they transferred the
license to us. The man instrumental in obtain-
ing this rice agency was my brother, Oei
Tjong Hiong, of Kian Gwan, Bangkok, and its
general manager, Tan Tjin Koan. We
bought a very large quantity of rice for Java,
which was very strange because Indonesia
had been always self-supporting in rice and
been exporting surplus rice. Rice remained a
very important product for us until Indone-
sian groups, out of jealousy, managed to start
all sorts of rumor that we bought the rice of
poor quality at too high prices and tried their
best to put a finger in the pie. I would say
that it was because of these Indonesian
groups' activities that a lot of bad feeling was
created. It was they who bought rice of
wrong quality at wrong prices.
In the 1950s under the Benteng program, the
200
Indonesian government began restricting
foreign exchanges. Did this affect your
trading activity?
Yes, of course. Because you could not open
letters of credit and could not obtain foreign
exchanges. If you exported, you had to sur-
render the foreign exchange earnings and
were repaid in local currency at very
unrealistic rates. If you look at Indonesia
now, there is no black market against the offi-
cialrate because it is a more or less realistic
rate, but before, the discrepancy was
ludicrous; nobody was prepared to work at
the official rate.
In other words, the business environment for
the Oei Tiong Ham group changed greatly
after the Pacific War. Sugar production
declined, so there was less business for sugar
milling, and trading was in difficulties because
trading, especially import trading, became
restricted. Does this mean that the group
declined over time in the 1950s?
Yes, I would definitely say so.
How did you get to the Singapore office? Was
this your first overseas assignment?
No, I went to our Shanghai office first. Then,
when the Communist Revolution came, the
office was closed, and Tjong Hauw transferred
me to Singapore. Unlike other brothers, I
took orders from Tjong Hauw, because I
believed that it was necessary for a business
organization. In my short career with Kian
Gwan, I moved to many places. I worked in
Semarang, Surabaya, Shanghai, Hong Kong,
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Bangkok, and Singapore.
In the prewar period, did both the Semarang
and Surabaya offices handle sugar, or was it
only the Surabaya office which handled sugar?
Both did. For example, the Krebet sugar fac-
tory sent sugar to the Surabaya office, and the
Redjoagoeng factory sent sugar to the
Semarang office.
In the prewar period, Semarang was a small
city compared with Surabaya. Ocean-going
ships had to stay offshore since the port was
not deep enough and there were no loading
and unloading facilities. On the other hand,
Surabaya was the major port and the center of
economic activity at that time. And after the
war, Jakarta became the major city. Didn't
you feel that it was better to move out of
Semarang?
In the prewar period, we kept our head-
quarters at Semarang because it was where
our father did business. But after the war,
although nominally our headquarters was in
Semarang, the Jakarta office became de facto
our headquarters. Tjong Tjay, who was the
chief executive officer for about a decade
before the confiscation, lived in Jakarta.
What happened to your bank after the Pacific
War?
Oei Tjong Hauw phased it out after the Pacific
War. It had been inactive anyway. I don't
think it had done any actual commercial bank-
ing. It had been acting as a sort of bank for
the group.
Why did he decide to phase it out? You say it
was not much of a bank, but he could have ex-
panded it and made it a full-fledged commer-
cial bank.
Yes, the idea was good. But the trouble with
the bank in the prewar period was that he put
one of his younger brothers in charge. The
younger brother, who was a very nice person
and with whose family (his wife and
daughters) I was very friendly, did not have
any business capability. He just sat in the
bank and did nothing. If he had been a
dynamic person, we would have had a bank
which could become a leading financial institu-
tion in the postwar period.
What happened to the shipping company?
We sold our shares in Heap Eng Moh Steam-
ship Co. We sold them to the Dutch
shipping company, Koninklijke Paketvaart
Maatschappij, or KPM for short.
Did you sell your shares before the Pacific
War?
No, after the war. I think it was in the mid-
1950s, a little before KPM was nationalized
by the Indonesian government. The na-
tionalization was a stupid move on the part of
the Indonesian government. The whole in-
surance world turned against them.
What happened to your alcohol distillery in
Shanghai?
I was in Shanghai two years ago. I did not go
to the factory. But I hear they are using it as
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a godown.
Was it confiscated when the Communists
came to power or was it sold before that?
It was confiscated in 1948 or 1949. After so
many years, they decided to pay us a compen-
sation. I think the amount was about 1.5
million Chinese dollars. When my brother
started the distillery in the 1930s, our invest-
ment in it was 4 million US dollars, so th~ com-
pensation was entirely disproportionate.
Did you say 1.5 million Chinese dollars?
Which was equivalent to... ?
At that time, one Singapore dollar was
equivalent to one Chinese dollar.
Then, since it was about two Singapore
dollars to one US dollar, the compensation
was about 750 thousand US dollars, wasn't it?
Yes.
Summing up the postwar development of Oei
Tiong Ham Concern, can we say that it
definitely declined and that the decline was
partly due to the change in business environ-
ment after independence and partly due to the
ownership structure which prevented anyone
person from taking an effective control of the
group. Is this correct?
Yes, it is correct. About the problem of
ownership structure, every director had the
same share and authority, so nobody was effec-
tively in charge. Somebody could be in
charge in name but not effectively.
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8. Importance of the Military
After independence, did you feel that it
became important for businessmen to
establish close contacts with the military?
Yes. It was more important to establish con-
tacts with military authorities than with
civilian authorities.
Why?
Well, I think if you look around even now in In-
donesia and look at countries like Thailand
and Burma, you'll see that those societies are
very much controlled by the military. With
right contacts, Chinese companies can survive
and do well. As a Chinese company or in-
dividual, we are fair game. You see, we have
no strong country that stands behind us and
protects us, like, for instance, the Japanese.
The Japanese have Japan behind them. Also,
the English people once had the great navy to
protect them. And the Americans, you see,
find American citizenship as a strong protec-
tive influence. But the overseas Chinese all
over the world have no such things. They
have to roll with the blows and survive
through their own wits. In this particular
country, I think, all the Chinese who have
done well have done well because of right con-
tacts. Right contacts may involve some
civilian authorities, but the majority of impor-
tant contacts always involved military
authorities.
Even during the Sukarno period?
Yes. It was of no use to know the minister
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who studied in Europe and with whom you
could speak in Dutch if your factory was in the
rural area, for he could not protect you when
you needed help.
Are you saying that connections with the
military were more important because they
offered security?
Yes. They could provide security, and also
help us directly in doing business. For exam-
ple, in the purchasing of rice and other
materials, somehow we found that this was
mostly in the hands of military authorities, or
they were connected with such activity.
I want to ask you about the role of the military
in the smuggling trade in Indonesia during the
Sukarno period. Did you have to deal with
them at that time from Singapore?
I bought a lot of copra from Sulawesi. I did a
lot of dealing with Colonel Sumual who rebel-
led against Sukarno. I offered him to be his
representative in Singapore. So, a young In-
donesian lieutenant came here. I helped him
to charter a ship to get copra from various
places in Sulawesi, such as Menado. We sold
the copra to Germany.
Inside Sulawesi, did Colonel Sumual have
agents?
They were Chinese middlemen. His army
saw to it that the copra they collected would
not be stopped anywhere and be smoothly
transported for export. At that time, without
any help from the military, you could not do
anything in Indonesia. I did a very good
business with Colonel Sumual's group.
Did you have a similar arrangement in rubber?
No, only copra. I bought some rubber from
Chinese smugglers in Sumatra, but this was
not very safe. I had to advance money to buy
rubber and send a ship to transport it, but the
ship might get confiscated. It was risky. I
know some people here who got their ships
confiscated two or three times, and went
bankrupt.
9. Anti-Chinese Sentiment
Did your family, being a leader of the Chinese
community, do anything about the rise of anti-
Chinese feeling in the 1950s?
I cannot say truthfully that we made any
effort.
I am sure the Chinese community was worried
about the rise of anti-Chinese feeling in post-
independence Indonesia. Since Kian Gwan
was the largest Chinese business organiza-
tion, the Chinese community, I suppose, ex-
pected you to playa leadership role.
They may have thought that because of our
strong financial and economic position, we
could lead them in the effort to change the
tide. But whether that was really so or not, I
cannot say. I don't think we can claim that
we were so patriotic or so worried about the
Chinese community that we made conscious
efforts to stem the anti-Chinese sentiment.
When the anti-Chinese sentiment was rising
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in the 1950s, did you make special efforts to
expand overseas operation and reduce the
relative importance of the Indonesian opera-
tion?
When Tjong Hauw was still alive, I often
pointed out to him that we should not put all
eggs in one basket. But he always replied to
me that he had not done that, by citing our in-
vestments in Shanghai (where we had a
modem distillery), Bangkok, Singapore, and
New York. Of course, our investment in New
York, as I will explain to you later, was made
under a quite different circumstance and was
not much of a business proposition. So, even
Tjong Hauw was aware that we should not
put all eggs in the Indonesian basket. But the
point is we did not move fast enough in expand-
ing our overseas operation. We should have
moved out our assets much more than we did.
Why couldn't you move fast enough?
Because of a sort of complacency. We were
strong in Indonesia. If we moved out to New
York, except some rubber brokers, nobody
knew us. If we went to Amsterdam, some
Dutch brokers probably knew our name, but
nobody else did. But in Indonesia, we were a
big shot, and many people knew us. So, it
was difficult to move out from the place we
felt comfortable into a place where we had to
start from almost nothing.
If you had had the determination to expand
your overseas operation, what sort of business
would you have gone into?
With the benefit of hindsight, we could say
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that politically, the situation in Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand was much better for
us. We could have invested in these coun-
tries. Besides interests in business, we
owned a lot of property, but we were unfortu-
nately situated in the wrong country. If that
property had been situated in those three
countries I mentioned, we would be a very
big property owner today.
At least, you could have gone into property
development in Singapore, Thailand, and
Hong Kong.
Yes, we could have done that. If we had, we
would have done very well.
It was only your brother in Bangkok who
went in this direction and has done well,
wasn't it?
Yes.
Have you heard about the businessman
named Robert Kuok?
Yes, I know him very well.
He seems to have moved his business opera-
tion to Hong Kong. He made his name in
Malaysia, but when the business environment
deteriorated under the New Economic Policy,
he seems to have had the determination to
shift his major business activities abroad.
Yes, but even in Malaysia, he still has a large
interest.
But at the same time, he has a large business
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interest in Hong Kong.
50 I understand. I met Robert a number of
times at parties, and one time, on a plane to In-
donesia, asked him what he was doing. He
was telling me that he was considering the
establishment of a sugar refinery in Sumatra.
His business interests are geographically
spread.
Yes, which we did not do in time. When we
spread, we went into the wrong countries.
We went to Shanghai, New York, and Amster-
dam. New York was not a bad place to move
to, but we did it without much preparation
and determination to succeed. We went
there not for business, but because two
shareholders thought that Indonesia was un-
comfortable to live in and chose to live in New
York.
10. Confiscation
Could you tell me a little about events leading
to the confiscation of Oei Tiong Ham Concern
in 1961 by the Indonesian government? I sup-
pose that it did not come suddenly, so there
must have been hints coming from the Indone-
sian government.
The great difficulties we faced with the
government might be considered as hints, but
none of us really expected such a swift con-
fiscation, which was, in my view, illegal.
Who do you think was behind the confisca-
tion?
I would say generally that it was caused by fer-
vent, super-nationalistic Indonesians, and it
was masterminded by the public prosecutor
Gunawan. I don't know Mr. Gunawan myself;
I never met him.
Some people I talked to say that Gunawan
could not have acted alone. They say that he
was probably supported by 5ukarno. Did you
hear at that time there was something Kian
Gwan did which angered Sukarno? For exam-
ple, you told me that you were helping Sumual
in smuggling out copra from Sulawesi. Isn't
it possible that after his rebellion, Sukarno
found out about your assistance and got mad
at you or your company? Of course, for this to
stick, we still have to explain the few years
gap, between the rebellion and the confisca-
tion, but I wonder if there were concrete steps
Kian Gwan took which angered Sukarno.
I do not believe that Sukarno was behind the
confiscation of Kian Gwan. I believe that it
was Gunawan who was directly responsible
for the confiscation of Kian Gwan. It is cor-
rect that I was helping Sumual in smuggling
copra from Sulawesi but my participation in it
was behind-the-scenes and under cover of Mr.
A.P. Lim and Lt. Wantania, who were the
officials fronting this operation in Singapore.
The thing which triggered the confiscation
was the court case which we started in
Holland against the Indonesian government,
in which we succeeded in liberating a blocked
share portfolio which was held at the ]avasche
Bank. I also believe that Gunawan made use
of the fact that not one of the Oei family
remained behind in Indonesia to fight our
case, and thus we were all convicted in absentia.
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Do you know Gunawan's background? Why
do you think that he persecuted your com-
pany?
He was once in Semarang as judge or govern-
ment prosecutor. I think that like many of
the new, modern Indonesians, he was anti-
Chinese. And Kian Gwan being the symbol
of Chinese business acumen in Indonesia, we
were the natural target. On top of this our
management and board of directors were
weak because they were still thinking very
much in terms of the old, prewar colonial
scheme of things. They did not realize the
very high nationalistic aspiration of Indone-
sians around them. They thought that they
would go back to the old strong position they
had held under the Dutch. They never
thought of establishing close contacts with im-
portant Indonesian officials. The officials
who counted at that time were military men,
but our board always shied away from dealing
with the military.
Then, would you say that your board did not
adjust well to the changing business environ-
ment?
Yes. Most of the directors were no longer in
line with the thinking required for that time.
But somehow, I could not muster the support
of most of the shareholders. I think this was
due to the fact that they considered me too im-
patient and volatile a person. For instance, it
was often held against me that during the
Japanese occupation, I was arrested because
of my outspoken sympathy for the Allied
cause and my antagonism towards the
behavior of the Japanese occupying
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authorities. I got myself into all sorts of ac-
tivity, which caused my arrest by the
kempeitai. I think the shareholders at that
time, who were my elder half-brothers and
younger full brothers, were of the opinion that
I was not sufficiently mature or cautious to
head our Indonesian operation at the time
when dealings with Indonesia were very
volatile. It is difficult for me to say whether
their view was right or wrong. I personally
feel that if I had been in charge, the whole con-
fiscation would not have come about, because
I am convinced that I would have maintained
the right connections with the military
authorities and succeeded in coming into close
contact with Sukarno, whom I had already
met in 1945 and 1946.
If Kian Gwan had maintained such connec-
tions, it could have at least survived for
another four years, until the change in govern-
ment took place. Then, under the New
Order, Kian Gwan would have been in a good
position to expand again. Don't you think so?
I believe so. But only if we had changed the
whole top management. If one looks around
in Indonesia now, there are many Chinese,
some of them are my friends, who were very
small people then but very powerful now. All
came up because of right connections.
So, if Kian Gwan had stayed on for another
few years, it might have been able to establish
the right connections with the government
and been in a good position, especially
because of more professional management, to
take advantage of the expanding economy
after 1965.
Yes, I personally believe so.
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All the remaining brothers.
So, the confiscation was a deadly blow to the
history of Kian Gwan, wasn't it?
Perhaps not "deadly,» but certainly "severe.»
The confiscation was due to a bad reading of
the situation and bad public relations on the
part of the top board of Kian Gwan.
Let me go back to 1961 when Kian Gwan was
confiscated. Where were you when that took
place?
I was here in Singapore. I must say that
nobody in Indonesia was prepared for it. I
learned about it when I opened a morning
paper.
What actions did you take then?
I did not take any actions. I knew from our
previous discussions that my brothers were
not very keen about my having much to do
with our Indonesian operation because, as I ex-
plained to you, they thought I was too volatile
a character to deal with the Indonesian situa-
tion.
But didn't your family have to do something
about-maybe not so much about your Indone-
sian operation as Oei Tiong Ham Concern's
assets outside Indonesia? Wasn't there some
consultation in the family?
Yes, of course, after the confiscation, we had a
meeting in Amsterdam.
Who came to the meeting besides you?
How many were left at that time?
Seven of us. I presided the meeting because I
was chairman of the board. I expressed the
view that I would try to keep whatever we had
outside Indonesia out of the clutches of the In-
donesian government, even at the risk of an-
tagonizing them further. I was prepared to
write off Indonesia completely, and would
rather concentrate on expanding our offices
outside.
Where were your overseas offices located at
that time?
Let me tell you first about my two half-
brothers, Tjong Yan and Tjong Ik of the
Tjong Hauw group. They were very nice peo-
ple, and I was always on cordial terms with
them, but I disagreed with them on business
matters. They never worked at any offices
outside Semarang. They grew up there as
school boys. After they finished their
primary education, they went straight to the
company and were immediately made ex-
ecutives. I don't think they di,d any useful
work. A few years after the Pacific War,
they felt that life in Indonesia was no longer
pleasant, so the two of them, who had always
been inseparable, sitting next to each other in
the same office in Semarang, decided to go to
New York to start an office there. They
cleared this with Tjong Hauw, and he con-
sulted me. I was very much against it, but
again, you see, when two shareholders
wanted something badly, they could have it.
There was no need to set up an office in New
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York, but it was not possible under our setup
to prevent them from going ahead with the
plan. Eventually they went there with about
one million dollars. They immediately moved
into an expensive place on Park Avenue. I
don't begrudge all this. Mter all, they were
multi-millionaires. But you cannot run a
business like that. They had two expensive
apartments, and had a chauffeur-driven car.
You know how expensive these things are.
So, the New York office was doomed from the
very beginning. It could never survive.
In Europe, didn't you have an office in Amster-
dam?
Yes, it was run by the number two brother in
the Tjong Hauw group, Tjong Tjiat.
How was that office doing?
It was living by the grace of the Indonesian,
Singapore, and Bangkok offices. The Amster-
dam office approached European companies
for which those Asian offices were acting as
agents and charged 10 percent commission on
whatever they shipped.
It was a sort of skimming operation, wasn't it?
Yes. Since I was managing the Singapore
branch and suffered from this arrangement, I
protested vehemently, and I finally got it
cancelled, but it took years.
So, were the paying overseas offices around
1960 only in Singapore and Bangkok?
Yes. As you know, the right thing to do is to
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choose a place where you need an office and
appoint the right manager there, but in our
case, we opened an office in a place where our
shareholders wished to live. There was no
feasibility study done beforehand, and there
was no budget for the office. If a new office
could not survive, financially strong offices
like the one in Singapore were told to support
it.
Didn't you have an office in Rio de Janeiro?
Yes, but it was not part of Kian Gwan. It was
a property development company started by
my brother Tjong Hiong. I believe he went
there, in the first place, at the instigation of
my late mother who did not like him to stay in
Bangkok, and I also believe that he nurtured
high hopes of having a successful independent
career in South America. Not being a trading
company, it was not affected by the confisca-
tion.
Going back to the time of the Indonesian
government's confiscation of Kian Gwan.
Soon afterwards, you say your family got
together in Amsterdam. You must have
made a number of decisions then. What deci-
sions did you make? What did you consult in
the meeting?
We had to face the inevitability that the con-
fiscation would bring a lot of trouble to our
operation outside Indonesia. For instance,
the Singapore office did a lot of rubber
trading, and its rubber supply came from our
offices in Sumatra. Now that our businesses
there were confiscated, the Singapore office
lost a physical back-up in rubber trading. So,
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it had to go into speculative trading if it
wanted to continue in rubber trading. So, the
confiscation meant not only that we lost a
greater part of our assets but also that our in-
ternational operation was greatly affected.
Our overseas offices did the bulk of the
trading with our Indonesian offices, but with
the confiscation, this became no longer
possible.
Did the family then decide to split up the
overseas assets?
Yes, eventually, but not right after the con-
fiscation. After the confiscation, I looked for
new businesses for the Singapore office. For
example, I acquired a Fiat agency, and set up
the first assembly plant in Johore Bahru
where we assembled Fiat cars (which we
distributed ourselves) and Mitsubishi cars for
Cycle and Carriage. I also went into banking;
I got involved in Malayan Banking Berhad.
As you know, I had to find other business ac-
tivities to replace our loss of the sugar and rub-
ber business. At the same time, as expected,
the Amsterdam and New York offices found
that they could not sustain themselves. They
were what I always called in our group
"parasite offices." They were not there
because they were necessary, but they were
there, so we had to support them. I finally
got tired of supporting those offices, and after
discussing the matter with my sons, I decided
that it was better for us to split. So, I offered
to exchange my holding of my brothers'
offices with their holding of the Singapore
office. But since those offices were not mak-
ing money and my holding did not amount to
much, in this exchange, I had to pay a substan-
tial amount of money to pay for my brothers'
holding of the Singapore office. To raise the
money, I had to sell the Fiat business and
some other assets I had here. In this way, my
sons and I became the sole owner of Kian
Gwan Singapore. This splitting-up was done
within a few years after the confiscation.
After the nationalization of Dutch companies
in Indonesia, didn't you get any inkling that
the same fate might fall on Kian Gwan?
I had no inkling. Kian Gwan was an Indone-
sian company. After the war, we had to
decide whether to keep our Dutch passports
or trade them in for Indonesian passports. I
was particularly requested by my brothers to
surrender my passport, which I did very reluc-
tantly, because I had been in the Dutch army
and pro-Dutch. But it was explained to me
that if the shareholders of Kian Gwan were
not all Indonesian, it would not be considered
a national company. So, I surrendered my
passport. It was years later that I found out
that my elder brothers who had advocated the
surrender of our passports kept their Dutch
passports. This upset me very much at that
time.
Didn't all of your brothers become Indonesian
citizens, at least nominally?
No. I surrendered my passport, and so did
Tjong Hauw. Tjong Tjiat, Tjong Yan, and
Tjong Ik told us that they had surrendered
their passports, but they never did.
But isn't it possible that your brothers who
did not surrender their Dutch passports
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became Indonesian citizens? The Indonesian
government, in order to consider your com-
pany Indonesian, must have asked its
shareholders to submit their certificates of na-
tionality. Since Kian Gwan became legally an
Indonesian company, those brothers must
have been Indonesian citizens.
It is possible. They may have had dual
citizenship. This was not allowed, you know,
either by Indonesian law or Dutch law.
Maybe, some people got away with it. But I
did really surrender my Dutch passport and
took an Indonesian passport, which I later really
regretted. After the confiscation, because
of my criticism of the Indonesian government,
the consul general of Indonesia here in
Singapore refused to renew my passport, and
so for many years, I lived as a stateless
person.
Are you now a Singapore citizen?
Yes, I am a naturalized Singapore citizen.
So, you are saying that you were stateless
before you became a Singapore citizen. But
you were a permanent resident even then,
were you not?
Yes. I was stateless, but was a permanent
resident of Singapore. I'll tell you a bit more
about how I became stateless. There was a
well-known lieutenant general serving as the
consul general of Indonesia in Singapore. He
was always disagreeable to me. I went many
times to see him to extend my Indonesian
passport, and every time I was told, "Come
back tomorrow." One day I walked into his
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office. When he saw me, he asked, "What are
you doing here? Did you come back to beg for
a passport again?" I said, "No, I came to throw
myoid passport at your face. You can keep
the bloody passport. " I literally threw it at his
face.
11. Oei Tjong Hauw and Oei Tjong
Tjay
Could you tell me a little more about your half-
brother Tjong Hauw? I hear he was a rather
capable manager.
I think my brother's strong point was that he
was a good politician. He was a very suave
person; he was very likable. He was always
impeccably dressed, compared with me; I
have been always informal in dress. And I
think he was a good public relations man. So,
with the Dutch at that time, he was very
useful as president director of Kian Gwan.
As a businessman, I don't think he was
anywhere near my late father's level.
How did he fit into Indonesia after the war?
Did he, for example, speak Bahasa Indonesia?
Yes, he spoke it well. But he was not the
type of man who could fit into the new situa-
tion.
So, even if he had lived for another 10 to 15
years, the confiscation would not have been
avoided?
I don't know about that. He might have been
able to prevent that, at least the head-on crash
which my younger brother Tjong Tjay was
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not able to. As I said, Tjong Hauw was a
very diplomatic person. Tjong Tjay was too
young. You cannot blame him too much.
Right after graduating from college, he came
back to the Indonesian turmoil, and one direc-
tor exerted pernicious influence on him. His
name is Tjoa Soe Tjong; I think he is still
alive. You will find his name mentioned in
Mr. Liem's book. Mr. Liem portrays him
as one of the strong, capable directors of Kian
Gwan. But I disagree with him on this com-
pletely. I consider him as the man who led us
on the road to the confiscation. My demand
to my brothers at that time was very clear. I
said, "You are in a mess in Indonesia. I am
the only one of the family who can handle this
job. You give me Indonesia, but I want Tjoa
Soe Tjong out. I want Tan Tek Peng retired,
and Djie Ting Ham retired. I want to bring in
my own team." Djie Ting Ham and Tan Tek
Peng were timid and inept at dealing with ag-
gressive Indonesians, whereas the most promi-
nent of our directors at that time, Tjoa Soe
Tjong, was capable but had divided loyalties.
12. Oei Tjong Ie in Singapore
When the nationalization came in Indonesia,
did you have a substantial property in
Singapore?
Yes, we did.
Was it not enough to rebuild Oei Tiong Ham
Concern?
No. At that time, the property market in
Singapore was still depressed, and our property
was not enough. At that time, with the prop-
erty which is worth a few million dollars
today, you could raise only a small amount of
money-maybe only a tenth of what can be
raised now.
I give you one example. Around 1954, I
built the residential area called "Oei Tiong
Ham Park" in honor of my father. We sold
the cheapest type of bungalow for 35,000
Singapore dollars. About five years ago, after
the property boom, such a house was selling
for one million Singapore dollars. Now, even
with property prices down, it sells for over
800 thousand Singapore dollars. I know this,
because my Chinese wife sold one of the
houses there I had given to her since she was
getting older and did not have a child.
It is a fantastic increase in property prices,
isn't it?
Yes.
In Singapore, is there any street named after
your father?
No. The only place named after him is Oei
Tiong Ham Park, which I built. In the Na-
tional University of Singapore, there is a hall
named after him, since he donated, I think,
one hundred thousand Singapore dollars,
which is equivalent to, I don't know, at least
one or two million Singapore dollars today.
And to St. Joseph Institution, I donated
36,000 Singapore dollars in honor of my
father because they needed money for the
modernization of a hall in a sports complex.
The hall was named after my father. When
they moved, they approached me for money
again. I refused because they did not say
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anything about the hall I had donated. The
old building is just standing there; nobody is
doing anything about it. I think that is
neither fair nor courteous. But even here in
Singapore, after so many years, my father's
name is still well known.
When you came to Singapore, did you use
mainly a Chinese or European bank?
I didn't deal with a Chinese bank much
because I found its interests high, even at
DCBC of which we were a substantial
shareholder.
Why do you think that a Chinese bank charged
higher interest rates? Since it must have
had a lower overhead cost than a European
bank, it was in a position to charge lower
interest rates.
I haven't thought about it. At that time, a
Chinese bank dealt more with real estates and
gave loans against mortgage, and was not well
equipped to deal with documentary business,
such as the opening of letters of credit. I
think this is why its rates of interest for such
commercial transactions as commercial
papers were higher. Now, I think, they are
competitive.
In retrospect, do you think that you should
have strengthened banking in the postwar
period instead of phasing it out?
Yes. I think we should have gone into banking
as I chose to do here. I was one of the
founding members and founder chairman of
Malayan Banking Corp. You know that it
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became the number-one bank in Malaysia in a
short time, which I am very proud of because
that happened when I was chairman. I would
have stayed in banking but for our unfor-
tunate choice of Khoo Teck Puat as managing
director. In the mid-1960s, he got us into
trouble. He did to Malayan Banking Corp.
what he would do later to the National Bank
of Brunei. I did not lose money much, but
went through months of vigorous interroga-
tion. I came out clean. I stayed on the board
until1981. I was the only founding member
who stayed on for so long a time. In 1981, I
resigned of my own accord, for a very silly
reason. The board had been getting bigger
and bigger, and I was no longer chairman.
And many of our directors were chain
smokers, and I hated smoking. So, I finally
told the chairman that I wanted to quit.
Earlier, when I wanted to resign, he told me to
stay on. He promised to control smoking dur-
ing the meeting; he himself was a chain
smoker. But finally I had to tell him that I
wanted to resign. I was well over sixty years
old, and wanted to keep my health. I could
no longer stand smoking.
Why do you think that Mr. Khoo was
unscrupulous in his business method?
Basically, he is a greedy man. He suffers
from megalomania. He is not honest.
What is a little puzzling about him is why he
had to be still unscrupulous even after he
became a big businessman. It is easier to
understand that he had to resort to an
unscrupulous method in the initial phase, but
there was no need to continue to do so.
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That is right. Often, even a big crook can
become respectable once he succeeds. Khoo
also tried this, by making donations to charity.
But he still owes a bank money. This
time, he was not dealing with the Malaysian
government; he was dealing with the sultan of
Brunei.
In Malayan Banking Corp. was he managing
director and were you chairman of the board?
Yes.
So, since he was managing the bank, you
didn't know the day-to-day operation of the
bank.
No, I did not know. The unfortunate thing
was that a few of the assistant managing direc-
tors and general managers were helping him.
So, it was not so difficult for him to manipulate
matters.
The successful businessman today, Khoo Kay
Peng of Malayan United Industries (MUI),
used to work at Malayan Banking Corp.,
didn't he?
Yes, he was working for us. He was manag-
ing a branch in a small town; I think it was
Segamat. I am a bit surprised because I
never thought him to be an outstanding,
clever man. Another of our executive staff is
Teh Hong Piow of Public Bank. He was my
foreign exchange manager.
Did he strike you as a bright man?
Yes, he was a bright man.
Was Teh Hong Piow a member of the Khoo
Teck Puat team?
No, he was not. I have normal regards for
Teh Hong Piow. I also have that for Khoo
Kay Pengo He was one time on the board of
Malayan Banking Corp.; he was vice-chair-
man of the bank because he was a political
figure. The chairman and vice-chairman
were the nominees of the Malaysian govern-
ment. I was also a Malaysian government
nominee, but I am not a Malaysian but a
Singaporean.
Who were the major investors in Malayan
Banking Corp. when it was formed? Were
they mostly Singaporean?
No, there were a number of Malaysian
Chinese investors. It was more Malaysian-
owned than Singaporean-owned.
Was Khoo Teck Puat a Malaysian?
He was originally a Singaporean. He later
became a Malaysian.
When the bank was set up, was he already a
Malaysian?
He was still a Singaporean. A little after the
bank was set up, the Malaysian government
appointed him as a Senator. Because of this,
they granted him citizenship, which would nor-
mally take ten to twelve years. In his case,
because of the senatorship, he got citizenship
in a short time.
If your partner had been a more honest
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banker, do you think that you would have suc-
ceeded in reviving an Oei bank?
No, I don't think so. Malayan Banking was a
completely different setup. Our family bank
would not have grown as fast as Malayan
Banking did. In the post-independence
period, banking became a little political, and
we would not have been too successful in the
banking field. Malayan Banking's growth
depended heavily on the backing of the Malay-
sian government, which a non-Malaysian-
owned bank would find difficult to obtain.
I was more interested in a finance company
while I was chairman of Malayan Banking. I
was involved in the management of Malayan
Finance Co. I was interested in this because
at that time, I was a motorcar dealer. I needed
a finance company to sell my cars. At one
time, it was more profitable to sell cars on hire
purchase than to sell cars in cash. I could
make extra money in that way by charging
interests to car buyers.
13. Kian Gwan Bangkok
Who owns the Bangkok office now?
It belongs to two of my brothers and one out-
sider. Not all have an equal share. I don't
know the exact proportion.
What does the Bangkok office do now?
It is the Thai agent for NCR. It has had this
agency for quite a long time-25 to 30 years.
It was earlier involved in the auto business.
There is a big auto repair shop behind Kian
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Gwan Building on Wireless Road in Bangkok.
Yes, but it is now let out to Toyota. Before,
we were using it ourselves because we were
Ford's agent. We were also the agent of a
Japanese car company called Prince Motor,
which was later absorbed by Nissan.
Then, has Kian Gwan in Bangkok been deal-
ing in machinery, like office machines and
autos?
Yes, but also it has been involved in real
estate. It has a big piece of land on Wireless
Road. There is a big office building there.
You saw it, didn't you? We, rather my
brothers, are building a second building.
Did your brothers have that piece of land for a
long time?
My brother Oei Tjong Bo wisely bought it
some years ago.
Have the lines of your Bangkok office been
machinery trading and real estate?
In its early years, their major business was
rice trading, and then, I think rubber was
added. Machinery trading and real estate
came more recently.
Is your father's name well known in Bangkok
also?
No, but the name Kian Gwan is well known.
If you say Kian Gwan, it is OK. I noticed it
about ten to fifteen years ago when a customs
official became courteous when I told him I
Interview: Oei Tjong Ie
was a director of Kian Gwan when he asked
me what I was going to do in Thailand and
who I was. The customs and immigration offi-
cials at the airport are now better disciplined,
but at that time, they were very difficult to
deal with and you had to sort of bribe your
way.
In 1940, when you joined the company, where
was your Bangkok office located?
I don't remember the name of the street, but
it was near a canal and in the Yip In Tsoi
Building. The building was named after the
businessman Yip In Tsoi, who was as well-
known in Bangkok as Eu Tong Sen was in
Malaya. It was near a fruit market. It was
near the Hua Lampong Railway Station.
Did the office then move to Wireless Road?
No, it first moved to Surawong Road where
the old Trocadero Hotel is. My brother
Tjong Hiong, the South American brother,
built it with me. That was where we started
the rice business. Then we sold it when our
brother Tjong Bo bought a land on Wireless
Road and put up a building there.
How many years ago did you move to
Wireless Road?
It must have been in the early 1970s.
How was the situation in your Bangkok office
when the Indonesian confiscation came? It
must have been smaller than your Singapore
office.
Yes, but it was self-sufficient and fairly well-
off. It was not financially uprooted. The only
thing was that its cash flow was disturbed.
Weren't its banking connections seriously
affected by the Indonesian confiscation?
No. The Bangkok office had been dealing
with Chartered Bank and, I think, also with
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and this con-
tinued after the confiscation.
14. The New Order Period
After Suharto came to power, I am told that
you were asked to go back to Indonesia and
revive Kian Gwan. Is this correct?
No, it was not exactly like that. When Mr.
Suharto took over, it was reasoned that the
people who suffered under Sukarno would be
compensated by President Suharto. It was a
logical way of thinking. So, 1was also induced
to approach President Suharto and ask him to
return our property. 1 wrote two to three let-
ters of petition to President Suharto, of which
I have not even had the courtesy of
acknowledgment. I had several meetings
with one of his close advisors, Humardani.
The meetings were held at his house. He had
the habit of receiving a visitor barefooted, sit-
ting in pyjamas trousers, and sitting with his
feet on a table. I went there with my nephew,
the son of Tjong Hauw. The nephew was a
member of ASPRI, a presidential advisor. At
that time, I thought that it was an important
job, but later found out that there were hun-
dreds of them. Humardani told me at one
time, "I would discuss the return of your prop-
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erty with President Suharto, but why don't
you show faith in Indonesia first? Suharto is
keen about having a sugar refinery in
Sumatra. Why don't you build one there?
Why do you always have to talk about your
old property? Those are gone anyhow. Why
don't you start something new, and you can
get back all money easy." I said, "No, after
our experience, I am not in a position to ask
my family to invest five to ten million dollars
to start a new factory. "
Apart from that, I was approached by
several veterans who said that they could help
me in getting our property back. For a few
years, I did my best. They said, "I cannot see
you in Indonesia, because it is too obvious.
I'll go to Singapore. Can I take my family
along?" So, each time, I sent four to five first-
class tickets, and paid their hotel bills and
shopping bills. I spent so much money on all
these people, without any concrete results.
So, at a certain point, I had to stop this.
I don't think any person who had his proper-
ties confiscated by Sukarno got anything back
under Suharto. The same thing is going on in
China. All sorts of people I have never heard
of are writing to me, saying that they can help
me in getting back our properties near Amoy
from the Chinese government. I have never
even been there. They say my father owned
a house and other properties there.
Do you think the Dutch companies which
were nationalized by the SUkarno government
got any compensation?
I think this was dealt with on a government-
to-government basis, and they received some
compensation, though it may not have been
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adequate. In our case, we didn't get
anything. So, I object to the term "na-
tionalization. " In our case, it was outright con-
fiscation.
Do you know that after the Indonesian govern-
ment's takeover, Kian Gwan became the
state-owned trading company, Radjawali.
Yes.
Do you feel that President Suharto could at
least have given you back the trading com-
pany?
Yes. But I don't think that he was in a position
to do anything. When the Sukamo govern-
ment seized our assets, it distributed them to
various government corporations and
organizations, such as the Army. So, in
retrospect, it seemed politically impossible for
Suharto to give them back to us. The loot
had already been divided.
So, it is not true that he was anxious to invite
you back.
I don't think Suharto knew that I existed. He
knows me now, but not at that time.
15. Succession Problem
I now want to go back to the ownership struc-
ture of Oei Tiong Ham Concern. When your
father died, were its shares given to different
children?
When my father died, out of all his children,
nine sons inherited the shares. They in-
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herited an equal share. The younger sons
who were not yet 21 years old at that time
could not exercise their rights until they
reached that age.
What happened when one of those sons died?
Were his shares given to his children?
Yes, or to his heirs. In the case of two of my
half-brothers, they left their shares to their
surviving brothers.
In a Chinese business in Southeast Asia, the
problem of succession often arises when the
father dies, and the business tends to be split
up. The problem seems to be due to equal in-
heritance, or if not equal, shared inheritance,
which has been a traditional inheritance
system in the Chinese family. In the case of
Oei Tiong Ham Concern, it was not split into
different companies, but ownership was
shared. Didn't this create difficulties for a
person who headed the group, especially in
creating a strong leadership?
Yes. In a Chinese business, we have often
seen that someone builds up a big business
but by the time it reaches the third genera-
tion, it folds up. In the case of Oei Tiong
Ham Concern, it is true that deterioration
started in my generation, that is, the third
generation. Why is this so? The problem was
not equal ownership per se. It was the fact
that amongst the nine or eight remaining
shareholders, there was no clearly defined
authority; all were equal in shareholding and
thus became equal in authority. Then, among
the Chinese, there was a tendency to think
that an older one is a wiser or more capable
one, but this is often wrong. In our particular
case, with the exception of Oei Tjong Hauw,
my other three elder brothers were not
capable managers. When I was chairman, I
did not have an authority to give them instruc-
tions or replace them. I couldn't transfer
them, either. If I needed somebody in
Shanghai and picked one of them to go there,
he could refuse it, and there was nothing I
could do about it. Theoretically, authority
was vested in me, but when I tried to exercise
it, it often did not work for the members of the
family-this is what you expect of a Chinese
family business. For instance, my elder half-
brothers always stayed in the head office in
Semarang, and never learned any other
aspects of our business. They came to the
office when it pleased them-they might come
at nine, ten or eleven; they might take a two to
three hour lunch break; and when they did not
feel like working, they stayed away from the
office and went to play tennis. It is fine if you
can afford to live like that, but you cannot run
a business like that.
What do you think your father should have
done to keep Oei Tiong Ham Concern going?
I think my father was a realistic man. If he
had only lived longer, he would have weeded
out ineffective sons. He would have put them
in a position where they could maintain
themselves but could not exert too much
influence.
But even so, he would have had to retain a few
sons, not likely only one son, and since they
shared ownership, the problem you described
would have come up, although in a less
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magnified way. The few who remained could
have fought each other, and a serious leader-
ship problem could have arisen.
Yes. You could not solve the problem, but you
could contain it. When my father decided on
the nine sons, according to my mother, he
created four shareholders from the Oei Tjong
Hauw group, another four shareholders from
my group, and made Oei Tjong Swan a lone
single shareholder who held a casting vote in
the case of deadlock between the two groups.
What do you mean by the four shareholders?
As I explained to you, nine brothers inherited
Oei Tiong Ham Concern. There were three
groups. One was the Oei Tjong Hauw group,
another my group, and the third, Oei Tjong
Swan. Each of the first two groups had four
brothers who held shares-one share each.
He figured that Tjong Swan would never join
the Tjong Hauw group because there was cer-
tain rivalry between the two and that Tjong
Swan would join my group. He did not
foresee that Tjong Swan would sell out so early.
I do not know what my father would have
done, but under his management, it would
have been quite possible that some of my
·brothers would work under outsiders. But
under the ownership structure which evolved
after my father's sudden death, this became
impossible. No brothers would take orders
from outsiders. I can say that I was the only
one in the family who, even if a superior was a
non-Oei, would take orders from him. I think
for a company to survive, such a discipline is
necessary.
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To avoid such a problem, the family can leave
management to professionals, although it
should retain the right to determine basic
management policy. In fact, this is practiced
by the sons of Lee Kong Chian in Singapore.
What do you think of this arrangement?
This sort of thing has theoretical and practical
sides to it. Any conception you dream of can
be theoretically perfect, but whether it works
or not depends on various individuals who oc-
cupy top positions. I do not think anybody
has a clear-cut solution for this. The tragedy
of a Chinese business, I think, is that in the
first generation, one man has the whole say
and authority and runs a business successfully
despite many mistakes because he is right
more often than he is wrong and so his
average is good, but after it gets big, in the
second and third generations, since the number
of family members involved in management
increases, the line of authority gets blurred,
and then I think decay sets in, which is exactly
what happened to us.
Do you think some other big Chinese business
families in Southeast Asia have shared similar
problems?
Yes. Look at the Eu Tong Sen family. I
would say that he was equivalent to Oei Tiong
Ham in Malaya. As you know, he became
very big, based on tin mining. But his whole
empire has disappeared because his sons had
equal share and equal authority. And some of
them were playboys. In the case of the Loke
family, they were a bit luckier. I don't think
they have suffered so much deterioration in
the second generation. But who knows what
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will happen in the next generation?
Loke Wan Toh, who founded the Cathay
group, was a second generation Loke. He
was a capable businessman, wasn't he?
That is very difficult for me to answer. He
and I were neighbors, and we were good
friends. I don't think he was exceptionally
capable, though he was well educated.
However, he had capable managers.
Someone was telling me that the problem
with his business was he died suddenly and
young.
Yes, he died in a plane crash.
Do you know the family of Eu Tong Sen
personally?
Yes, I do. I know the brothers. What hap-
pened to them was the same as what happened
to our family. You can see the two families
suffering from the same problem.
Wasn't Eu Tong Sen more traditional than
your father? For example, he did not have a
professional management team as your father
did. Isn't this correct?
Yes, I would say that is correct; he was more
traditional. This is a little ironical, for my
father, who was Chinese-educated, did not
speak English at all but was more modern in
business management, whereas I think Eu
Tong Sen spoke English but was more tradi-
tional in business.
In view of your experience, what do you think
is the best way to transfer the ownership of a
large family business to the next generation?
The only solution I can think of is to go public
and have outsiders on the board. Major
shareholders need not be executives in the
company, though they may have to be on the
board.
So, you are suggesting that there should be
some degree of separation of ownership from
management.
Yes. There is also another thing you must
consider. In Singapore, until the recent
change in estate duties, if you die and leave an
estate of two to three million dollars, which is
not a large estate by the present-day standard,
the estate duty amounts to sixty percent or so.
So, it will wipe you out. Suppose you have a
large business here and your assets are
known. If you die, the settlement of your
estate duties may take even ten years. If you
have ten million dollars in cash and have to
pay a fifty percent estate tax, you will lose five
million dollars but can still keep the remaining
five million dollars. But if your asset is a
business valued at ten million dollars and you
have to pay five million dollars estate duties in
cash, it will wipe you out completely. This is
what happened to a lot of people here.
Do you know anything about the legal aspect
of a foundation? Some families like the Lee
and Shaw families in Singapore set up a foun-
dation and transferred their shares to it.
Yes, you can make a foundation or create a
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trust through which you can retain control.
Can you avoid estate tax in that way?
I don't know whether you can avoid it. But
you can take certain steps and defer paying it
every time. It is a very complicated legal
thing, and I never bothered really to look into
it.
So, your feeling is that for a large family
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business to keep going over generations, it
has to go public and get outsiders on the board
of directors.
Yes, I think so. I don't think you can assume
that because you are the son of an owner, you
are entitled automatically to become an ex-
ecutive with a high salary and all privileges.
In order to become an executive, one has to be
able to fulfill the duty which comes with that
post.
